Introduction
Over the last 20 years, and in the wake of multiple shocks to the world's financial systems, international financial standards have proliferated, 1 creating a complex dynamic between national (or regional) regulation and international norms, between hard and soft law. For many years, the belief in the desirability, indeed the inevitability, of regulatory convergence as a response to the difficulties thrown up by the internationalization of capital markets went largely unchallenged.
2 Supporting this belief among policy makers internationally was a well-accepted but misguided hypothesis to the effect that the most developed economies, with the most efficient markets, were a function of a superior legal system, the common law.
3 Thus, regulatory frameworks in certain developed economies (notably the United States) were worthy of emulation and could form the basis for international standards. 4 Internationalized US law and capital markets regulation came to set the standards, playing into a desire by the United States to exert dominance in world capital markets.
However, different forces are now at work. US hegemony of the international markets suffered a blow in the post-crisis world. Rising regulatory action by the European Union and associated unilateralism has also created a new dynamic in international financial standard setting. Different actors now come to the standard-setting process with different motivations and expectations; markets are changing dramatically, shaking regulatory assumptions. Regulatory convergence and harmonization are no longer givens. 5 There is also a growing realization that global coordination by way of standardization itself may be problematic. Problems that slip through one regulatory net could slip through all of them, were they to be closely coordinated. Less coordination may have its benefits.
Looking forward, how will these developments change the course of international financial standard setting and its role in world capital markets? How will this affect the role and activities of IOSCO, the world's pre-eminent standard setter for the capital markets? Is it time to look beyond international financial standard setting?
3 The "legal origins" or "law and finance" literature, as this body of scholarship came to be known, was enormously influential and is still accepted as gospel in certain quarters, such as the World Bank, despite early and continuing academic criticism. See e.g. Cally Jordan, "The 4 Regulators in the more developed markets were viewed as having a better understanding of how markets functioned and provided insight into where less developed markets were heading. Secondly, there was also a desire on the part of heavily regulated market participants to level the playing field between more and less developed markets. 
The Backdrop to IOSCO Standard Setting
Having originated as a focal point for cooperative efforts by national regulators, IOSCO now identifies itself as a standard setter. The Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (1998, 2004, 2010 ) remain IOSCO's best known standards, but a raft of principles, guidelines, methodologies, codes, consultation papers and implementation reports followed. 6 Early on, IOSCO standard setting attracted the attention of other international bodies, the G7 (and successors), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and its successor, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These international institutions collaborated to develop a financial assessment "tool kit" to be used in diagnostic and prophylactic exercises conducted on a country-by-country basis, and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was launched in 2000. The IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, which first appeared in 1998, suited their purposes and in this way, IOSCO was drawn, like it or not, into the ambit of international policy networks. The IMF and the World Bank, although not regulators or market institutions in any sense, joined IOSCO. In turn, IOSCO standards were disseminated worldwide through the FSAP exercises.
The speed and brutality of the global financial crisis, emanating as it did from the United States, shook the foundations of US hegemony in the international markets. Equally, US-inspired IOSCO initiatives, designed as predictive and stabilizing measures, had fallen short. With renewed EU regulatory activism since 2009 had come greater European influence in international standard setting and a corresponding diminished US influence in the standard-setting process. As Roberta Karmel notes, the United States has been both leader and follower in international standard setting, and is much less happy with its role as a follower. commissioner of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would complain in 2014 about "top-down, forcible imposition of one-size-fitsall regulatory standards on sovereign nations." 8 IOSCO standards have disappointed 9 and are, at least in some quarters, under attack. They have not provided the easy fix once hoped for. Internationalization of the capital markets, however, has hardly abated. It is time to think beyond international financial standards as we know them, in mapping the future of capital markets regulation.
Positive Impact of IOSCO Standards
Before identifying the various difficulties associated with IOSCO international standard setting, it is useful to consider its impact in a positive light. IOSCO has served well as a forum for formal and informal regulatory cooperation and communication. Scarcely a capital markets regulator in the world does not participate in IOSCO. The contacts and channels of communication provide a valuable service in fostering international engagement among economies worldwide.
Making use of IOSCO standards, the FSAP exercises conducted by the IMF and the World Bank, much criticized in certain regards, have nevertheless promoted a common understanding of an often poorly understood segment of the economy. While there are still ample opportunities for miscommunication, due to linguistic challenges, diverse practices and the vagaries of different legal systems, IOSCO standards and the FSAPs have aided in the creation of a commonly understood language of finance.
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IOSCO standards and the FSAP process have also contributed to the popularization of finance, its democratization if you will, at a time when the markets demonstrate growing complexity. Capital markets issues and regulatory difficulties have been forced out of the penumbra of technicality and are no longer the privileged preserve of professional guilds.
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The scope and reach of the FSAP exercises, 12 encompassing economies big, small and inbetween, have generated an impressive amount of data, some of it spot on. The vulnerabilities in Iceland's financial sector were identified years before the sector imploded. Equally, the broad reach of the FSAP exercises can identify successful initiatives of smaller economies that might not otherwise garner international attention.
Weaknesses in IOSCO Standard Setting
Nevertheless, IOSCO standard setting has demonstrated notable weaknesses. Former SEC commissioner Daniel Gallagher is not far off the mark with his criticism of top-down, assumption-ridden, one-size-fits-all standards, although many of those assumptions may in fact emanate from US regulation. The Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, for example, being largely inspired by US regulations and institutions, missed many of the hot buttons of the global financial crisis of a decade ago. 13 The crisis fomented in the interstices of US regulations, and the standards based on them did not send up flares during the FSAP exercises.
14 US securities regulation is also a difficult, idiosyncratic, archaic area of the law. Standards and principles based on US securities regulation inevitably subsumed obsolescent concepts, especially in an area as fast-moving as the capital markets.
Early standards and principles failed to recognize the diversity and complexity of capital markets. The 1998 International Disclosure Standards for Crossborder Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers (largely copied from the US Form 20F) was, in effect, only applicable to equity securities.
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Some 10 years later, a separate set of principles appeared, specifically applicable to debt securities. Equally little heed was paid to differences in legal systems, constitutional imperatives or regulatory approaches when formulating and implementing the international standards.
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The FSAP exercises produced ratings based on the level of compliance with international standards, creating expectations among institutional investors. Regulatory initiatives could be adopted simply to influence these ratings and signal compliance to the international markets. Where inappropriate or ineffective, these regulatory initiatives constituted a monumental waste of time and effort, squandering scarce regulatory resources.
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The creation of the FSF, and later the FSB, under sponsorship of the G7 and Group of Twenty, respectively, added a new political dimension to international standard setting. IOSCO was no longer in control of its own standardsetting agenda. New regulatory objectives, sometimes difficult to reconcile with traditional regulatory goals of investor protection, were dropped into international standards, systemic stability being a prime example. For members with enough clout, the international standardsetting apparatus could be put in motion to bypass a domestic regulatory impasse. 18 Increasingly, there is a view that certain kinds of activity are more or less impervious to the application of international standards; these activities are inherently local and need to be addressed at the local level. Market conduct, for example, sensitive to the particularities of market structure and practices, and dependent on local enforcement measures, falls within this category. Going local makes more sense and produces better results than recourse to international standards.
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Going beyond International Standards
The goal of this policy brief is to identify useful areas for further research and consideration. Recourse to international standard setting has become an ingrained response to both crossborder and domestic regulatory issues. It is not easy to think beyond international standards. But without doing so, international standards will continue to recycle outdated concepts or validate inappropriate approaches, resulting in potentially ineffectual regulatory action.
18 The US SEC had long wanted to regulate the operations of US creditrating agencies, but was unable to garner the domestic support to do so. A first step would be to jettison the idea that there is one particular set of international best practices. There can be multiple approaches, depending on particular circumstances. Equally worthy of the dustbin is the notion that regulatory harmonization and convergence are either inevitable or desirable. IOSCO has already nuanced its position on harmonization as an ultimately desirable objective in and of itself. The major capital markets -the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and now Chinaare looking to develop regulation tailored to the specifics of their own markets and their aspirations for them. Acknowledging that markets may be diverse and idiosyncratic requires acceptance that their regulation may be so as well. This is not to deny the utility of continued coordination.
This recognition would have implications for the FSAP exercises of the IMF and the World Bank. As with modern grade school report cards, ratings and rankings would be dispensed with in favour of a more nuanced and subjective form of assessment.
A means of breaking the grip of consensus thinking in the formulation of international standards should be devised. The emphasis on consensus stifles audacity and innovation in confronting regulatory issues. A dedicated laboratory or workshop that would encourage thinking outside the box, questioning and testing the assumptions of capital markets regulation, would be welcome. The SEC has long made use of "concept releases" to float trial balloons with new ideas so as to stimulate discussion among market participants, without necessarily committing to a course of action. IOSCO may not be a natural forum for such activities, but it could perhaps act as a clearing house for work produced elsewhere. In moving from speculation to implementation, putting theory into practice would require action of course. There may well be IOSCO members who would be interested in limited scope experimentation with new regulatory techniques.
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In terms of alternatives to international standards, it might be worthwhile to also consider the development of model laws, tailored to specific kinds of economies and providing a menu of optional approaches. In the aftermath of the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the later blossoming of Asian capital markets, experts and consultants travelled the world producing a flurry of country-specific corporate and securities laws -many of which, like international standards, disappointed. Academics and policy makers puzzled over why "good law" would fail, sometimes identifying "poor enforcement" as the culprit.
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With the benefit of hindsight, there may be good lessons to be taken from these experiences.
22 Surprisingly, despite the frenetic legislative activity of the last 20 years, there are still regulators searching for regulatory models compatible with their legal systems and economic circumstances. The problem can be particularly acute in smaller economies, irrespective of the level of economic development. Regulatory disarray, in the United States and the United Kingdom (both of which have provided models in the past), has not been helpful. In any event, US and UK legislation can be problematic as a model: too complex, dependent on sophisticated financial and legal practitioners for implementation, and common law specific. The European Union, in regulatory high gear since the global financial crisis, may be looking at capital markets with fresher eyes, producing better models, especially for smaller economies.
Producing a set of variegated model laws for capital markets regulation could be a challenging longterm endeavour, at a time when there are urgent, pressing concerns in the markets. Nevertheless, urgency -together with a spirit of innovation and experimentation -can produce desirable results. Finding the best forum in which to produce model laws, and keeping the process depoliticized, might prove to be the greater challenges.
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